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A darknet is an advertised and routed portion of 
Internet address space that contains no advertised 
services. Any traffic observed on a darknet is therefore 
illegitimate and darknets are useful tools for observing 
the level of background ‘noise’ on a larger network. 
Darknets have been used in existing IPv4 networks to 
help to identify malicious traffic, malware trends, or 
the consequences of misconfiguration. We have 
created what may be the world’s first IPv6 darknet to 
help us observe the ‘noise’ present on the IPv6 
Internet and to see how this differs from the IPv4 
Internet. Initial results suggest that the level of 
undirected malicious software active on the IPv6 
Internet is currently minimal and there is no apparent 
undirected port-scanning activity. We suspect this is 
partially a (predicted) consequence of the larger IPv6 
address space and also an indication of the immaturity 
of the IPv6 Internet at the present time. 
 
 
1. Introduction and motivation 
 
A darknet is simply an advertised and routed 
portion of Internet address space that contains no 
advertised services. Any traffic observed on a darknet 
is therefore abnormal and darknets are useful tools for 
observing the level of background ‘noise’ on a larger 
network. Darknets have been and are used in existing 
networks to help to identify the types and sources of 
malicious traffic present on the larger network of 
which they form a part [1]. The benefit of a darknet is 
that there is typically very little legitimate traffic 
present (network mapping projects may generate 
legitimate traffic to a darknet) which makes the 
process of identifying illegitimate traffic extremely 
simple. Traffic typically observed on a darknet is 
either the result of malware scanning for hosts to 
infect, the result of misconfiguration, or backscatter 
from hosts under attack. 
IPv4 darknets can see huge amounts of traffic for 
even small amounts of address space, e.g. average 
traffic levels of 541.8kbps in a single /24 of darkspace 
[2]. IPv4 darknets are characterised by relatively 
constant receipt of traffic to the darkspace. This is not 
surprising given the widespread and indiscriminate 
nature of IPv4 malware ‘deployed’ on the Internet 
today. 
The IPv6 Internet has now achieved global propor-
tions, although it does not offer the same level of qual-
ity, in terms of route efficiency and link bandwidth, as 
the IPv4 Internet [3]. As part of our ongoing work to 
support and develop the IPv6 Internet through the op-
eration of the UK6x Internet Exchange [4], we consid-
ered that it would be instructive to establish and moni-
tor an IPv6 darknet to assess the level of malicious 
activity present on the IPv6 Internet, and also to verify 
the predicted lack of undirected port-scanning activity 
on the IPv6 Internet as a consequence of the much lar-
ger address space [6]. We consider that this may also 
become a great resource for a longitudinal study of 
malware in the IPv6 Internet.   
Section 2 below briefly indicates related work in the 
area. Section 3 details the design of the deployed 
darknet. Section 4 presents our initial results while 
Section 5 provides brief details of some recent activity 
undertaken to extend the scope of our darknet 
experiments. Finally, Section 6 draws some 
conclusions from the results and suggests directions 
for further research. 
 
2. Related work 
 
The idea of a darknet (or network telescope as the 
technique is also known) is certainly not new and there 
are several important papers in the academic literature 
relating to previous work observing activity on the 
IPv4 Internet. [8][9][10][11][12] There has also been 
some recent activity (although as yet unpublished) re-
lating specifically to IPv6 Internet Background Radia-
tion. [13] 
 
3. IPv6 darknet design 
 
This section provides basic details of the design and 
configuration of our IPv6 darknet. 
 
 
3.1. Network configuration 
 
Design of the IPv6 darknet was kept deliberately 
simple. A darknet server was installed at our IPv6 PoP 
in London, UK, with two Ethernet connections. One of 
these was cabled to the PoP LAN to provide a 
management interface to the darknet server. The other 
interface was linked directly to a spare port on a core 
router. A darknet prefix was chosen from our larger 
IPv6 aggregate and the router configured to route this 
prefix to the darknet server over the dedicated link. A 
/48 prefix was used for the darknet. This is 1/248 of the 
entire IPv6 address space and 1/231 of allocated IPv6 
address space (see Section 6 below for elaboration on 
this point). Figure 1 illustrates the configuration. 
 
Figure 1. Network configuration for the IPv6 
darknet installed at UK6x, Telehouse, London, 
UK. The Core Router is configured to route 
the Darknet Prefix to the Darknet Server over 
a dedicated point-to-point link. The Darknet 
Server is also accessible via the PoP 
Management LAN to enable management 
operations to be undertaken without polluting 
the darknet packet capture operation 
 
3.2. Darknet server configuration 
 
The darknet server configuration was based on a 
minimal subset of the information contained in [1]. 
The server is running the FreeBSD OS. We have 
configured it to run ntp to ensure relatively accurate 
timestamps on the logged packets. A blackhole route is 
installed for the darknet prefix to ensure that it isn’t 
possible for the darknet server to respond to any traffic 
sent to the darknet prefix. The pf packet filter is used 
to block all traffic in and out of the darknet interface 
thereby ensuring none of the running processes on the 
darknet server can be affected by traffic to the darknet 
prefix. Finally, pflogd is enabled to capture all packets 
arriving on the darknet interface and log them to a file 
for later analysis using tcpdump. It is also possible to 
view packets arriving in real time by executing 
tcpdump on the pflog0 virtual interface. 
 
3.3. Router interface configuration 
 
In addition to the configuration necessary to enable 
the point-to-point link to the darknet server and to 
route the darknet prefix over the correct interface, it is 
also worth noting two additional aspects of the router 
configuration specific to the darknet. 
 
 Router Advertisement messages are suppressed on 
the point-to-point link as they are not desirable on a 
statically configured interface and would only serve 
to pollute the darknet with extraneous packets. 
 
 A static entry is configured in the router’s 
Neighbour Cache with the MAC address of the 
darknet server NIC. This is necessary because the 
darknet server will filter Neighbour Solicitation 
messages by design, rendering the Neighbour 
Discovery protocol inoperative [5]. 
 
4. Initial results 
 
The darknet was installed at the beginning of 
December 2004 and in the period until March 2006 a 
total of 12 packets were observed. The following 
traffic has been observed (in the analysis below, our 











echo request seq 9 
− ICMP echo requests where mistyped destination 
address can be inferred from the fact that the 
destination address prefix is only one digit altered 





icmp6: echo request seq 1 
− Probably another typo, although in this case the 






− ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable Message 
(communication with destination administratively 
prohibited) indicating source address of the original 
packet was within the darkspace. The original 
packet was either deliberately or accidentally using 
a false source address. The presence of only a single 
such packet suggests accidental misconfiguration 






− ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable Message (no 
route to destination) indicating source address of the 
original packet was within the darkspace. The 
original packet was either deliberately or 
accidentally using a false source address. As above, 
the fact that there is only a single such packet 
suggests accidental misconfiguration that was 
quickly remedied. 
 
The sources for all the observed traffic are within 
one or other of our prefix allocations from RIPE. We 
have not seen any inter-provider traffic reach our 
darknet.  
 
5. Recent activity 
 
In an effort to obtain more data from our IPv6 
darknet experiment, we have added a second /48 
darknet prefix sourced from within the pool of 
addresses used for our tunnel-broker service. This pool 
is relatively densely populated with hosts and may 
therefore result in a higher level of observable activity. 
We have also recently sought to verify our findings 
by establishing a second darknet at another location. 
To date, these activities to extend the darknet work 
have not yielded any additional results. 
 
6. Conclusions and recommendations for 
further research 
 
It is clear from the initial results detailed above that 
we have observed no darknet traffic that we can 
attribute to malware or port-scanning activity of any 
kind. The very low level of darknet traffic detected 
seems to be entirely attributable to misconfiguration. 
This is perhaps not surprising when we consider the 
theoretical implications of IPv6 for TCP and UDP 
port-scanning [6]. In addition, the IPv6 Internet is 
relatively small and under-utilised at the present time 
and consequently the incentives for malware authors to 
make their code IPv6 capable are not great. It will be 
very interesting to track the level of darknet activity 
over the coming years as IPv6 deployment and 
utilization escalates. 
The prefix allocated for our IPv6 darknet has a 
prefix-length of /48. Allocating a larger prefix may 
yield more data as the amount of darkspace 
encompassed would be commensurately greater. 
Indeed, a /48 is a tiny proportion of the already 
allocated IPv6 address space. The RIPE NCC IPv6 
Allocations page [7] shows a total of 2,954,600,515 
/48s allocated on 2006-03-29, which means that a 
single /48 is approximately equivalent to something 
between an IPv4 /31 and a /32, in terms of the 
proportion of allocated address space encompassed.  
Allocating a much larger darknet prefix is one area for 
further research. Similar activity to that reported in this 
paper, but utilising an IPv6 /32 has seen low-level 
regular scanning activity. [13] 
As the level of background traffic increases, re-
search could progress to developing automatic tech-
niques to separate the benign traffic (network map-
ping, misconfiguration) from the truly malicious. 
An IPv6 honeynet would also be an obvious direc-
tion for future research as levels of observed back-
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